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Public policy, trust and growth: disclosure of government 
information in Japan. 
 
 
 
 
Abstract. Since the end of the 1990s, local governments in Japan have enacted Information 
Disclosure Ordinances, which require the disclosure of official government information. This paper 
uses Japanese prefecture-level data for the period 1998–2004 to examine how this enactment 
affected economic growth. Furthermore, this paper explores how generalized trust is associated with 
the effect of information disclosure on economic growth. The Dynamic Panel model is used to control 
for unobserved prefecture specific effects and endogenous bias. The major findings are: (1) disclosure 
of government information has a positive effect on GDP growth; and (2) generalized trust enhances 
this effect on GDP growth. This implies that social trust has a critical influence on the effectiveness 
of policy. 
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1. Introduction 
 
It is well known that information asymmetry hampers the functioning of markets, resulting in 
market failure. Hence, government plays an important role in preventing market failure by, for 
instance, provision of public goods. Ideally, the government is required to act as a „benevolent 
dictator‟ to maximize social welfare. However, because of information asymmetry between 
government and citizens, it is difficult for citizens to evaluate and criticize the effectiveness of the 
government‟s activities. This leads politicians and bureaucrats to behave in a way that maximizes 
self-interest. It is widely acknowledged that bureaucrats in the government sector have an incentive 
to maximize their budget (Niskanen, 1971), and that the absence of profit incentives induces 
government organizations to be less efficient (Buchanan & Wagner, 1977). Consequently, the 
government has a detrimental effect on economic growth. Assuming citizens can obtain sufficient 
information about the government‟s activities, citizens are able to criticize the government if it is 
inefficient. Inevitably, the government is forced to be efficient to maximize social welfare, resulting in 
economic growth. Recently, local governments in Japan have enacted Information Disclosure 
Ordinances (IDOs), which require the disclosure of official information to ensure accountability 
(Jiyukokuminsha, 2009). These ordinances enable citizens to obtain information about government 
activities, reducing the information asymmetry between local government and citizens. Therefore, 
ordinance enactment is expected to accelerate economic growth. If so, enactment is important from 
the view point not only of democracy but also of economic efficiency. One of the purposes of this paper 
is to examine empirically the effect of IDOs on GDP growth. 
Social values related to corruption, norms, or social trust appear to have been shaped by 
traditional culture or religion (Gokcekus, 2008). Recently, researchers have begun to shed light on 
the social values which seem to affect economic efficiency (see, for example, Stutzer and Lalive, 2004; 
Arruñada, 2010; Schaltegger and Torgler, 2010). Social trust is one of the key concepts in the field of 
social science (Uslaner, 2002)1. Since the seminal work of Knack and Keefer (1997), a number of 
articles investigating the relationship between social trust and economic growth suggest that social 
trust is positively related to economic growth (e.g., Whiteley, 2000; Zak and Knack, 2001; Beugelsdijk 
et al., 2004)2. There are various channels through which social trust appears to affect economic 
growth. Bjørnskov (2010) suggested that social trust has a positive effect on schooling and rule of law, 
and in turn accelerates the investment rate or the growth rate3. Pre-existing mutual trust among 
citizens leads the welfare state to function well (Bergh and Bjørnskov, 2009). Interaction between 
trust, thought of as an individual behavior, and policy seems to be important to increase the 
                                                   
1 Social trust is one of feature of social capital (Putnam, 1993; 2000). 
2 Contrary to previous work, Berggren et al. (2008) presented evidence that when outliers are 
removed, the trust-growth relationship is no longer robust. 
3 Existing work found that social trust makes a contribution to human capital formation (Bjørnskov, 
2009; Papagapitos and Riley, 2009). 
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effectiveness of public policy4. Hence, this paper explores not only the effect of disclosure of 
government information on growth but also whether the level of trust accelerates the effect. There 
seems to be, however, a reverse causality between disclosure of information and growth, and also 
between trust and growth. This results in endogeneity bias, which we aim to avoid in this paper by 
using the Arellano-Bond type Dynamic Panel model. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Disclosure of official local government 
information is briefly reviewed in Section 2. Section 3 explains the data and methods used. Section 4 
discusses the results of the estimations. The final section offers concluding observations. 
 
2. Review of disclosure of local government information in Japan 
2.1. The Information Disclosure Act 
The disclosure of official information is thought to play an important role in ensuring government 
accountability, and is therefore promoted by local governments in Japan. Since the late 1990s, the 
number of local governments enacting IDOs increased significantly (Jiyukokuminsha, 2009). These 
ordinances guarantee citizens the right to any information that the municipality has. Once the 
ordinance is enacted, a municipality has an obligation to disclose information when a citizen 
requests it. For instance, citizens can access information about the process to appoint the supplier of 
public services. Hence, citizens are able to keep a close eye on collusion between politicians, 
bureaucrats and private companies. 
Municipalities are the lowest level of local government. A cursory examination of Figure 1 reveals 
that the rate at which municipalities enacted IDOs rose rapidly. In 1998, the rate was about 0.22, but 
reached 0.92 by 2004. This indicates that this period saw a drastic change leading to government 
information becoming more accessible to citizens. This change is expected to deter politicians and 
bureaucrats from behaving for self-interest. 
In 2004, there were 3123 municipalities in Japan‟s 47 prefectures, an average of about 66 per 
prefecture. Since 2005, the consolidation of municipalities has proceeded with some speed; resulting 
in the number of municipalities decreasing to 2333 in 2005 and then to 1795 in 20095. At the same 
time, the rate of municipalities enacting IDOs rose from 0.97 in 2005 to 0.99 in 20096. Annexation of 
                                                   
4 According to the argument of Algan and Cahuc (2009), the Danish policy on the labor market is 
characterized by unemployment insurance which leads to low unemployment rates. However, such a 
policy is thought to raise a moral hazard that is more difficult to overcome under conditions in which 
individuals are more likely to cheat. Hence, the provision of unemployment insurance is more costly 
in countries where social values are tolerant about cheating on unemployment, resulting in 
ineffectiveness of unemployment insurance policy. 
5 Between 1998 and 2004, number of municipalities decreased slightly from 3255 to 3123. 
6 Data for 2005 is available at 
http://warp.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/283520/www.soumu.go.jp/s-news/2005/050729_3.html (accessed 
November 28, 2010). 
Data for 2009 is available at 
http://www.soumu.go.jp/menu_news/s-news/16773.html (accessed November 28, 2010). 
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municipalities is thought to be positively correlated with the rate of IDO enactment. That is, the rate 
of enactment of IDOs reflects to some degree the annexation of municipalities. Furthermore, from 
2005 to 2009, the change in the rate of enactment is negligible. Therefore, we restrict ourselves to the 
period 1998-2004. 
 
2.2. Testable hypotheses. 
 
The supply of public goods is determined through a political process, and hence differs from the 
optimum level of supply in terms of economics. Bureaucrats in the government sector have a strong 
incentive to expand the organization for the sake of their powers and positions, which is why 
bureaucrats endeavor to maximize their budget (Niskanen, 1971). Because of the scarcity of 
incentives for maximizing social welfare, government organizations become less efficient than a 
„benevolent dictator‟ (Buchanan & Wagner, 1977). As a consequence, a government tends to supply 
unnecessary public goods. However, the cost for the supply of public goods is financed through 
taxation. Citizens are thus expected to criticize government policy when the cost of public goods 
outweighs their benefit. Nevertheless, a government has abundant information about government 
activities, which is often difficult for citizens to obtain. Because of this information asymmetry, 
“government can easily manipulate information to inflate the value of the public goods they want to 
supply” (Hayami, 2001, p.227). 
IDOs reduce the cost of collecting information about government activities, and the enactment of 
IDOs seems to have reduced the information asymmetry between government and citizens. Hence, 
citizens know how public spending is used and the extent to which it benefits them. Once citizens can 
access to the information, they are then able to criticize policies as being for the self-interest of the 
politicians and bureaucrats. Consequently, budget allocations become more efficient, resulting in 
economic growth. These considerations lead us to advance Hypothesis 1: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Government information disclosure accelerates economic growth. 
 
Even when an IDO is enacted, its impact depends on the attitude of citizens toward political 
participation. Social trust is positively associated with the overall quality of governance (Helliwell 
and Putnam, 1995). More precisely, social trust enhances participation in the political process and in 
turn improves the quality of government (Knack, 1992). Therefore, the effectiveness of information 
disclosure is reinforced by trust. That is, disclosure of information is less likely to enhance growth if 
there is lower level of trust. Possible outcomes of disclosure of information vary according to social 
values such as the level of trust among citizens. Hence, we also make the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Social trust enhances the effects of government information disclosure on economic 
growth. 
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3. Data and method 
3.1. Data 
Table 1 gives the definitions of the variables used in this paper, along with the means and 
standard deviations for the data used. This paper uses panel data at the prefecture level7. The 
structure of the data consists of 47 prefectures for the period 1998-2004. GDP per capita comes from 
Asahi Shimbun (2008). Population, political group members per head of population and the rate of 
IDO enactment are derived from Index Publishing (2006). The unemployment rate is available from 
the website of the Statistics Bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications8. The 
Population Census (1990, 2000), as published by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications, provided data for to the number of people who graduated from university. The data 
between 1998 and 2000 were generated by interpolation based on the assumption of constantly 
changing rates between 1990 and 2000. The data between 2001 and 2004 were calculated by adding 
the annual number who graduated from university between 2001 and 2004, collected from the Basic 
Report for Schools (2001-2004) published by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and 
Technology. 
This paper uses the Japanese General Social Surveys (JGSS) data for constructing the proxy 
variable of prefecture-level generalized trust. The JGSS surveys were conducted throughout Japan 
during 2000-20039 using a two-step stratified sampling method, and were designed to be the 
Japanese counterpart of the General Social Survey in the United States. This survey, conducted 
through face-to-face interviews, included questions about individual characteristics such as 
generalized trust and prefecture of residence. The survey collected data from 12,299 adults, aged 
between 20 and 89 years. With respect to generalized trust, considered to be a crucial independent 
variable, respondents were all asked: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be 
trusted?” The possible responses to this question were "no", "depends", and “yes". The proportion of 
respondents who chose “yes” in each prefecture is used as a proxy variable for social trust in this 
paper. 
 
3.2. Methods 
 
To examine the hypotheses raised previously, this paper uses the Arellano-Bond type Dynamic 
                                                   
7 A Japanese prefecture is roughly equivalent to a state in the United States or a province in 
Canada. 
8 It is available from http://www.stat.go.jp/data/roudou/pref/index.htm. (accessed November 1, 2010). 
9 JGSS are designed and carried out at the Institute of Regional Studies at Osaka University of 
Commerce in collaboration with the Institute of Social Science at the University of Tokyo under the 
direction of Ichiro TANIOKA, Michio NITTA, Hiroki SATO and Noriko IWAI with Project Manager, 
Minae OSAWA. The project was assisted financially by a Gakujutsu Frontier Grant from the 
Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology for the 2000-2003 
academic years, and the datasets were compiled and distributed by SSJ Data Archive, Information 
Center for Social Science Research on Japan, Institute of Social Science, the University of Tokyo.  
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Panel model (Arellano, 2003). The estimated function takes the following form: 
Ln(GDP) it=1 Ln(GDP) i(t-1) + 2DINFit + 3DINF it *TRUSi + 4GROUPt +５UNEMPit + ６EDUit 
+7Ln(POP)it+ui +εit,                                                       (1) 
 
where the dependent variable is Ln(GDP) it  in prefecture i, for year t, and the s represent 
regression parameters. The lag in the dependent variable is included as an independent variable. ui 
represents the unobservable fixed effects of prefecture i and εit is the error term. The proxy for 
generalized trust, TRUSi, is a time-invariant variable. Hence, TRUSi, is captured by ui and so is 
removed from both the Fixed Effects and Dynamic Panel models. However, the interaction term 
DINF it *TRUSi, is retained because DINF it is not time-invariant. The structure of the data covers 6 
years for 47 prefectures. However, the Dynamic Panel model takes the first difference and Ln(GDP) 
lagged two periods or more are used as instruments, so 47 observations for two years are discarded. 
Dummy years are included to capture macroeconomic factors. To eliminate ui from the model, we 
take the first difference form as follows: 
Ln(GDP) it- Ln(GDP) i(t-1) =1 (Ln(GDP) i(t-1)- Ln(GDP) i(t-2)) + 2(DINFit - DINFi(t-1))  
+ 3(DINF it *TRUSi - DINF i(t-1) *TRUSi ) + 4(GROUPit- GROUPi(t-1)) +5(UNEMPit -UNEMPi(t-1))+ 
６(EDUit-EDUi(t-1))+7(Ln(POP)it–Ln(POP)i(t-1))+εit-εi(t-1).   (2) 
 
The dependent variable can be considered to be the growth rate of per capita GDP. Income is 
considered to influence the utility of citizens and so low economic growth leads citizens to criticize 
local government policy. Consequently, citizens require the government to disclose official 
information. This is why economic growth affects local governments‟ decisions to enact IDOs. The 
DINF and DINF*TRUS terms are treated as endogenous variables in the Dynamic Panel model for 
the purpose of controlling for the estimation bias10. We use endogenous variables lagged two-periods 
or more as additional instrumental variables (Arellano, 2003, p.168). 
2 can be interpreted as the effect of DINF change on per capita GDP. From Hypothesis 1, we 
anticipate that 2 will be positive. The interaction term DINF*TRUS is incorporated to examine 
whether social trust affects the disclosure of government information. Hypothesis 2 leads us to 
expect 3 to be positive. As for control variables, Olson (1982) emphasized that special interest 
groups have a propensity to lobby for preferential policies, imposing disproportionate costs on the 
rest of society. This effect is captured by the GROUP variable. Unemployment is considered to be 
inefficient labor allocation, and hence has a detrimental effect on growth. Therefore, GROUP and 
UNEMP are expected to have negative values. Human capital accumulation is thought to play a 
positive role on economic growth, and therefore the predicted sign of EDU is positive. 
 
                                                   
10 Baliamoune-Lutz (2009) used the Dynamic Panel model to control for endogenous bias by treating 
several independent variables as endogenous. In Baliamoune-Lutz (2009), the dependent variable is 
literacy rate while the endogenous independent variables include a proxy for institutional quality 
and an interaction term between institutional quality and a proxy for ethnic tension. 
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4. Results 
Table 2 shows the results of the OLS and the Fixed Effects estimations. In Table 2, results of OLS 
estimation are shown in columns (1) and (2), while those from the Fixed Effects model are in columns 
(3) and (4). Table 3 gives the results of the Dynamic Panel estimation where, as explained in the 
previous section, DINF and DINF*TRUS are treated as endogenous variables. The unemployment 
rate is affected by the economic growth because high growth leads to reduction of unemployment. In 
addition to DINF, UNEMP is treated as an endogenous variable and its values are presented in 
columns (2) and (4) of Table 3. 
We can see from Table 2 that DINF is positive in all of the estimations. DINF is statistically 
significant in the Fixed Effects estimation, but not statistically significant in the OLS estimation. 
This implies that the unobserved fixed effects in each prefecture have an influence and so their 
omission from the model causes the results to suffer from bias. Contrary to expectation, DINF*TRUS 
is negative, despite being statistically insignificant. UNEMP is negative as anticipated and is 
statistically significant in OLS estimation, but is not statistically significant in the Fixed Effects 
estimation. 
Turning to the results in Table 3, we check the validity of the Dynamic Panel estimation before 
discussing the results for each variable. The two important tests are Sargan‟s over-identification test 
and the second-order serial correlation test (Arellano, 2003). We present Sargan‟s test to check the 
validity of the instrumental variables. The null hypothesis is that the instrumental variables are 
uncorrelated to the residual. If the hypothesis is not rejected, the instruments are valid. 
Furthermore, confirming the null hypothesis that there is no second-order serial correlation for the 
disturbance of the first-difference equation is important because the consistency of the estimator 
relies upon the absence of second-order serial correlation. Table 3 tells us that both hypotheses are 
not rejected for all estimations, suggesting that the estimation results are valid. 
DINF is positive as anticipated, and is statistically significant in columns (1) and (2). As shown in 
columns (3) and (4), when the interaction term DINF*TRUS is incorporated it is positive and 
statistically significant. That is, generalized trust complements the disclosure of government 
information. From this, we argue that the effectiveness of a government‟s policy is affected by the 
degree of trust among citizens. We note that the results are obtained after controlling for unobserved 
fixed effects, macro factors and endogenous bias, and interpret Table 3 as implying that disclosure of 
government information has a positive effect on GDP growth and that generalized trust enhances 
the positive effect of information disclosure. The combined results of Tables 2 and 3 support both 
Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
As is generally acknowledged, asymmetric information is a cause not only of market failure but 
also of government failure, resulting in reduced social welfare. From the viewpoint of economics, 
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politician and bureaucrat are considered as the agent, while citizens are regarded as the principal. 
Information asymmetry between agent and principal induces the agent to act inappropriately from 
the viewpoint of the principal. That is, because of information asymmetry, moral hazards occur and 
result in economic inefficiency. Therefore policies to reduce information asymmetry are required, and 
a key purpose of this paper is therefore to investigate the effectiveness of such policies. On the other 
hand, researchers have recently shed new light on the role of social values such as trust on outcomes 
and effectiveness of policy decisions. However, this subject remains open to further work. 
Another purpose of this paper is to ascertain the association between trust and the effectiveness of 
the policy. Since the end of the 1990s, local governments in Japan have enacted IDOs. This paper 
uses Japanese prefecture-level data for the period 1998–2004 to examine how the enactment of IDOs 
affect economic growth. Furthermore, this paper explores how generalized trust is associated with 
the effect of information disclosure on economic growth. The Dynamic Panel model is used to control 
for unobserved prefecture specific effects and endogenous bias. The major findings are: (1) disclosure 
of government information has a positive effect on GDP growth; and (2) generalized trust enhances 
this effect on GDP growth. This implies that social trust has a critical influence on the effectiveness 
of policy. 
The findings above lead us to argue that the interaction between public policy and the degree of 
trust should be taken into account when the outcome of a policy is being considered. Outcomes of a 
policy vary according not only to economic conditions, but also to social values such as trust (Algan 
and Cahuc, 2009). Furthermore, policy design requires more than simply employing a policy 
expected to be effective under the traditionally given culture and value system. Policy makers should 
continually endeavor to change the perception of the citizens to ensure an economically efficient 
market that is acceptable to them. 
 
 
 
 
References 
 
Afonso, A., Schuknecht, L., Tanzi, V. (2005). Public sector efficiency: An international comparison. 
Public Choice 123: 321-347. 
Algan, Y., Cahuc, P. (2009). Civic virtue and labor market institutions. American Economic Journal: 
macroeconomics 1(1): 111-145. 
Angelopoulos, K., Pilippopoulos, A., Tsionas, E. (2008). Does public sector efficiency matter? 
Revisiting the relation between fiscal size and economic growth in world sample. Public Choice 
137: 245-278. 
Arellano, M. (2003). Panel data econometrics. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Arruñada, B. (2010). Protestants and Catholics: similar work ethic, different social ethic. Economic 
9 
 
Journal 120: 890-918. 
Asahi Shimbun. (2008). Minryoku (CD-Rom version).  Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun sha. 
Baliamoune-Lutz, M. (2009). Human well-being effects of institutions and social capital. 
Contemporary Economic Policy 27(1): 54-66. 
Berggren, N., Elinder, M., Jordahl, H. (2008). Trust and growth: a shaky relationship. Empirical 
Economics 35 (2): 251-274. 
Bergh, A., Bjørnskov, C. (2009). Historical trust levels predict current size of the welfare state. 
Forthcoming in Kyklos.   
Beugelsdijk, S., de Groot, H.L.F., van Schaik. (2004). Trust and economic growth: a robustness 
analysis. Oxford Economic Papers 56: 118-134. 
Bjørnskov, C. (2009). Social trust and the growth of schooling. Economics of Education Review 28: 
249-257.  
Bjørnskov, C. (2010). How Does Social Trust Affect Economic Growth? Forthcoming in Southern 
Economic Journal. 
Borge, L., Falch, T., Tovmo, P. (2008). Public sector efficiency: the roles of political and budgetary 
institutions, fiscal capacity, and democratic participation. Public Choice 94: 475-497. 
Buchanan, J.M., Wagner, R.E. (1977). Democracy in deficit: The political legacy of lord Keynes. New 
York: Academic Press. 
Doi, T., Ihori, T. (2002). Fiscal reconstruction and local interest group in Japan. Journal of Japanese 
and International Economies 16: 492-511. 
Doi, T., Ihori, T. (2009). The public sector in Japan: Past development and future prospects. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Gokcekus, O. (2008). Is it protestant tradition or current protestant population that affects 
corruption? Economics Letters 99: 59-62. 
Hayami, Y. (2001). Development economics: From poverty to the wealth of nations. (second edition). 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Helliwell, J.F., Putnam, R. (1995). Economic growth and social capital in Italy. Eastern Economic 
Journal 221: 295-307. 
Index Corporation. (2006). Chiiki toukei 2006 (CD-ROM edition), Index corporation, Tokyo. 
Knack, S. (1992). Civic norms, social sanctions, and voter turnout. Rationality and Society 4: 
133-156. 
Knack, S., Keefer, P. (1997). Does social capital have an economic payoff? A cross-country 
investigation. Quarterly Journal of Economics 114: 83-116. 
MacDonald, L. (2008). The impact of government structure on local public expenditures. Public 
Choice: 136 457-473. 
Meyer, S., Naka, S. (1998). Legislative influences in Japanese budgetary politics. Public Choice 94: 
267-288. 
Meyer, S., Naka, S. (1999).The determinants of Japanese local-benefit seeking. Contemporary 
10 
 
Economic Policy 17: 87-96. 
Niskanen, W. A. (1971). Bureaucracy and representative government, Aldine Atherton, Chicago. 
Olson, M. (1965). The logic of collective action : public goods and the theory of groups. Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge. 
Olson, M. (1982).The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social 
Rigidities. Yale University Press, New Haven. 
Papagapitos, A., Riley, R. (2009). Social trust and human capital formation. Economics Letters 102: 
158-160. 
Pellegrini, L., Gerlagh, R. (2008). Causes of corruption: A survey of cross-country analyses and 
extended results. Economic Governance 9: 245-263. 
Putnam, R. (1993). Making democracy work. Civic traditions in modern Italy. Princeton University 
Press, Princeton. 
Putnam, R. (2000). Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community. Simon and 
Schuster, New York. 
Schaltegger, C. A., Torgler, B. (2010). Work ethic, Protestantism, and human capital. Economics 
Letters 107(2):99-101. 
Statistics Bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. (various year). Zenkoku 
shohi jittai chosa. Tokyo: Statistics Bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications. 
Stutzer, A., Lalive,R. (2004). The role of social work norms in job searching and subjective well-being. 
Journal of the European Economic Association 2(4): 696-719. 
Uslaner, E. M. (2002). The Moral Foundations of Trust, Cambridge University Press, New York. 
Whiteley, P. (2000). Economic growth and social capital. Political Studies 48: 443-466. 
Williamson, C.R. (2009). Informal institutions rele: institutional arrangements and economic 
performance. Public Choice: 139 371-387. 
Zak, P.J., Knack, S. (2001). Trust and growth. Economic Journal 111: 295-321. 
 
 
 
 
 
11 
 
 
Fig.1. Rates of enactment of Information Disclosure Ordinances by municipalities. 
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Table 1. Variable definitions and basic statistics. 
Variables Definition (1) 
All 
(2) 
Standard 
deviation 
GDP 
 
Per capita income. (Millions yen) 3.57 0.70 
DINF 
 
Rates of enactment of Information Disclosure Ordinances 
(IDOs) by municipalities 
(municipalities enacting IDOs/All municipalities) 
0.63 0.32 
TRUS 
 
Rate of respondents who chose “Yes” 
 
11.9 2.70 
GROUP Political group members per population 
(Members of political group) / population 
0.54 0.49 
UNEMP Unemployment rate 
 
0.04 0.01 
EDU Rate of university graduation 
 
0.20 0.03 
POP 
 
Population (Millions) 2.68 2.47 
 
Note. Values are simple averages. Data source is the Japan Broadcasting Corporation (1979; 1996), 
Asahi Shimbun (2004), Index Publishing (2006) and the Statistics Bureau of the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and Communications (various years). 
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Table 2. Dependent variable is Ln(GDP) t :(OLS and the Fixed Effects model) 
 (1) 
OLS 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
FIXED 
(4) 
FIXED 
Ln(GDP)t-1 0.96*** 
(83.8) 
0.96*** 
(83.6) 
0.51*** 
(9.12) 
0.51*** 
(9.12) 
DINFt 0.008 
(1.27) 
0.01 
(1.29) 
0.02*** 
(2.90) 
0.06** 
(2.52) 
DINFt*TRUS  -0.02 
(-0.63) 
 -0.16 
(-1.47) 
GROUPt 4.65* 
(1.83) 
4.65* 
(1.83) 
18.8 
(1.23) 
20.2 
(1.31) 
UNEMPt -0.34** 
(-2.26) 
-0.36** 
(-2.34) 
-0.19 
(-0.45) 
-0.21 
(-0.50) 
EDUt 0.05 
(1.06) 
0.05 
(1.03) 
0.65* 
(1.76) 
0.67* 
(1.82) 
Ln(POP)t 
 
0.001 
(0.66) 
0.002 
(0.82) 
-0.06 
(-0.47) 
-0.06 
(-0.48) 
Constant 
 
-0.14* 
(-2.16) 
-0.15* 
(-2.23) 
  
Dummy year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.98 0.98 0.52 0.53 
Observations 281 281 281 281 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10, 5, and 1 per cent 
levels, respectively. „Yes‟ means that dummy years are included as independent variables. 
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Table 3. Dependent variable is Ln(GDP) t, : (Dynamic Panel Model) 
 (1) 
 
(2) 
 
(4) 
 
(5)  
 
Ln(GDP)t-1 0.18 
(1.21) 
0.21 
(1.21) 
0.34*** 
(3.04) 
0.34*** 
(3.33) 
DINFt 0.02* 
(1.93) 
0.02* 
(1.77) 
-0.04 
(-1.23) 
-0.04 
(-1.08) 
DINFt*TRUS   0.32* 
(1.88) 
0.28* 
(1.73) 
GROUPt 3.04 
(0.18) 
7.39 
(0.44) 
3.66 
(0.20) 
6.32 
(0.36) 
UNEMPt 0.35 
(0.76) 
0.23 
(0.51) 
0.40 
(0.82) 
0.23 
(0.50) 
EDUt 0.37 
(0.93) 
0.27 
(0.70) 
0.48 
(1.15) 
0.37 
(0.92) 
Ln(POP)t 
 
-0.003 
(-0.02) 
-0.13 
(-0.91) 
0.04 
(0.24) 
-0.04 
(-0.32) 
Dummy years Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Endogenous 
variables 
 
 
DINF 
 
DINF 
UNEMP 
DINF 
DINF*TRUS 
 
DISCINF 
DINF*TRUS 
UNEMP 
Sargan-test 
 <P-value> 
17.8 
<0.92> 
35.0 
<0.80> 
35.7 
<0.73> 
48.3 
<0.78> 
Serial correlation 
 Second order 
<P-value> 
-1.56 
<0.11> 
-1.40 
<0.16> 
-1.20 
<0.22> 
-1.17 
<0.23> 
Observations 233 233 233 233 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10, 5, and 1 per cent 
levels, respectively. „Yes‟ means that dummy years are included as independent variables. 
 
 
 
 
